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Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano: Does
Title VII Trump the Treaty?
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano' the Supreme Court
was presented with the issue whether article VIII(l) of the United
States-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 2 (FCN
Treaty) provides a defense to a Title V113 employment discrimina-
tion suit against a United States subsidiary of ajapanese corporation.
The Court avoided the question, however, holding instead that
Sumitomo (America), a New York corporation, is not a company of
Japan and thus is not covered by article VIII(l) of the Treaty.4 Effec-
tively, the Court evaded the weightier question that had been re-
solved differently in the Second 5 and Fifth 6 Circuits: whether a
1 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
2 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Ja-
pan, art. VIII(1), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
1. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical ex-
perts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their
choice. Moreover, such nationals and companies shall be permitted to en-
gage accountants and other technical experts regardless of the extent to
which they may have qualified for the practice of a profession within the terri-
tories of such other Party, for the particular purpose of making examinations,
audits and technical investigations exclusively for, and rendering reports to,
such nationals and companies in connection with the planning and operation
of their enterprises, and enterprises in which they have a financial interest,
within such territories.
Id.
3 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a) (1982) states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id.
4 457 U.S. at 189.
5 The Second Circuit in Sumitomo concluded that, while the Treaty parties intended
to cover locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign companies such as Sumitomo, the
Treaty does not protect Sumitomo's executive employment practices from Title VII re-
sponsibilities. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
6 The Fifth Circuit disposed of a strikingly similar case in a different manner. In
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982), the
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foreign corporation may avoid compliance with United States em-
ployment discrimination laws by using as a defense the FCN Treaty
provision guaranteeing freedom of choice in hiring. Thus, the
Sumitomo Court missed the opportunity to resolve the tension be-
tween Title VII employment discrimination laws and article VIII(l)
Treaty provisions. Despite a timely opportunity to hold that civil
rights laws cannot be abrogated by a commercial treaty, the Court
merely increased the confusion in an already unclear area of the law.
Petitioner Sumitomo is a New York corporation and a wholly
owned subsidiary of a Japanese general trading company. Respon-
dents, past and present female secretarial employees of Sumitomo in
New York, 7 filed a class action suit against Sumitomo, alleging that
their employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
hiring only male Japanese citizens for executive, managerial, and
sales positions.8 Sumitomo moved to dismiss in district court, claim-
ing that article VIII(I) of the FCN Treaty protects its practices. 9 The
district court denied the motion to dismiss and certified for interloc-
utory appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals the question
whether the Treaty's provisions exempt Sumitomo from Title VII's
obligations.' 0
The Second Circuit held that although article VIII(l) of the
Treaty is intended to cover locally incorporated subsidiaries of for-
eign corporations, the language of the Treaty does not exempt
Sumitomo from compliance with Title VII. l" The court stated that
to differentiate between Japanese corporations, local branches, and
locally incorporated subsidiaries in applying the Treaty provisions
would disregard substance for form, a practice previously rejected in
treaty construction,12 would contradict the purpose of protecting all
foreign investments, 13 and would create an illogical, "crazy-quilt pat-
Fifth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit that article VIII(l) of the Treaty covers a
locally incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, id. at 358, but contradicted the
Second Circuit by holding that the Treaty does protect the subsidiary from Title VII chal-
lenges to its employment practices. Id. at 362. The dissent would have held initially that
locally incorporated subsidiaries are domestic corporations under the Treaty's language
and thus cannot invoke article VIII(l) to protect their employment decisions. Id. at 372.
7 All but one of these employees are citizens of the United States. Avigliano [sic] v.
Sumitomo Shoji America, 473 F. Supp. 506, 508 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 552
(2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
8 457 U.S. at 178.
9 Id. at 179.
10 See 638 F.2d at 553-54 & n.2.
I I See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
12 638 F.2d at 556 (citing Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 922 (1977)) (Warsaw Convention, as any other treaty, "should be interpreted to
effectuate its evident purposes" in allowing airline employees to assert liability limitations
as a defense to an aircraft disaster suit).
13 638 F.2d at 556. The stated purpose of the FCN Treaty is:
[to strengthen] the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing be-
tween them and [to encourage] closer economic and cultural relations be-
tween their peoples . . . by arrangements promoting mutually advantageous
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tern" of rights and privileges.' 4
The Second Circuit found that despite its applicability to locally
incorporated subsidiaries, the Treaty does not shield Sumitomo
from Title VII claims. The freedom of choice language in article
VIII originally sought to circumvent laws in many United States ju-
risdictions and foreign countries that severely limited the employ-
ment of noncitizens. 15 Interpreting the words "of their choice" so
broadly as to license employers to evade Title VII laws also might
immunize employers from labor laws that protect unions, children,
and all employees. 16 Adherence to Title VII still would enable
Sumitomo to employ Japanese nationals in positions where such per-
sons are "reasonably necessary to the successful operation of its
business."' 17
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether article
VIII(I) provides a defense to a Title VII suit against a United States
subsidiary of a Japanese company. The Court found it unnecessary
to reach that question, however, deciding that, as a United States
corporation, Sumitomo could not claim protection under the Treaty.
The Court based its decision on the literal language of article
XXII(3) which states that the place of incorporation defines corpo-
rate nationality, a definition with which both parties agreed.' 8
Furthermore, the Court maintained that the Treaty's purpose is
to give corporations of each party legal status in the territory of the
other party comparable to that accorded domestic firms.' 9 The sig-
commercial intercourse, encouraging mutually beneficial investments, and
establishing mutual rights and privileges. . . based in general upon the prin-
ciples of national and of most-favored-nation treatment unconditionally ac-
corded ....
4 U.S.T. at 2066, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. "The effect of the Treaty is to assure that nationals of
one party are not discriminated against within the territory of the other party." 473 F.
Supp. at 509.
14 638 F.2d at 556.
15 Id. at 558-59. See Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The
Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947, 952-53 & n.28 (1979).
16 638 F.2d at 559.
17 Id. Section 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1982), states that:
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise . ...
Id. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that the
"bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception to Title VII is to be construed
narrowly. Id. at 334. The Second Circuit in Sumitomo advised that this exception, when
applied to a company such as Sumitomo, should consider its unique requirements of
knowledge of Japanese language, culture, business, marketing, and customs, as well as
ease in dealing with the parent company and business associates. The court was not
presented with this question and had no relevant evidence, however, so it declined to
determine whether Sumitomo's nonclerical positions qualify for the BFOQexception. 638
F.2d at 559.
18 457 U.S. at 180-85. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
19 Id. at 186. Of course, domestic firms must obey federal antidiscrimination laws.
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natories intended to assure foreign corporations of "the right to con-
duct business on an equal basis without suffering discrimination
based on their alienage." 20
Sumitomo's original motion for dismissal urged that discrimina-
tion on the basis of Japanese citizenship does not violate Title VII,
and in any event, its practices are protected under article VIII(1) of
the Treaty. Only the second question was certified to the court of
appeals. 2 ' In the appeal to the Supreme Court Sumitomo asserted
that despite the literal interpretation of the Treaty's language, both
Japan and the United States intended that the Treaty cover all Japa-
nese subsidiaries regardless of their place of incorporation.
Sumitomo further claimed that to adhere rigidly to the Treaty's lan-
guage would contradict its purpose. 2 2
Like Sumitomo, the plaintiff in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),
Inc.23 asserted that United States subsidiaries, as domestic corpora-
tions, must comply with federal laws prohibiting employment dis-
crimination. Although the district courts in Spiess and Sumitomo
agreed with the plaintiffs, 24 the Second and Fifth Circuits reversed,
holding that the subsidiaries are foreign corporations and may in-
voke the Treaty provisions. 25
The two courts of appeals split, however, on the issue whether
20 Id. at 188.
21 The district court refused to certify two questions of law that plaintiffs had ad-
vanced: whether an allegation of sex and nationality discrimination constitutes a valid
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and whether Sumitomo's common-law tort counterclaims
of abuse of process should have been dismissed. The court granted Sumitomo's request
for reconsideration of the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. The court again denied
the motion on the ground that the specific Treaty provision on which Sumitomo relied
does not apply to subsidiaries. See Avigliano [sic] v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., No. 77
Civ. 5641 (CHT) (Nov. 29, 1979) (unreported); 638 F.2d at 553-54 n.2.
22 457 U.S. at 185.
23 643 F.2d at 353.
24 Sumitomo, 473 F. Supp. at 506; Spiess, 469 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd, 643
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982). The district court in Sumitomo
did not rule on whether the language of article VIII, allowing freedom of choice in execu-
tive hiring, is sufficiently broad to exempt United States subsidiaries of Japanese compa-
nies from the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII. In its first opinion, the district
court held that a subsidiary incorporated in the United States cannot invoke the Treaty to
shield its employment practices, because article XXII(3) of the Treaty defines corporate
nationality as place of incorporation. 473 F. Supp. at 509.
In its second opinion, see supra note 21, the district court in Sumitomo granted that
article XXII(3) is not intended to exclude locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign com-
panies from any rights under the Treaty. The court stated nevertheless that the freedom
of choice rights apply only to nationals and companies of either Party within the territories
of the other Party. 638 F.2d at 555. Because article VIII does not grant locally incorpo-
rated subsidiaries rights under that provision, and article XXII(3) indicates that such cor-
porations are local citizens, the district court maintained its original view that Sumitomo
lacked standing to invoke article VIII. Id. The district court in Spiess arrived at the same
conclusion, holding that under articles VIII and XXII(3), locally incorporated subsidiaries
cannot invoke the Treaty as a shield against employment discrimination claims. 469 F.
Supp. at 9.
25 See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
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the discriminatory practices are protected under the Treaty. The
Fifth Circuit held in Spiess that the Treaty absolutely protects defend-
ant's practice of hiring only Japanese citizens for executive and tech-
nical positions. The court found no evidence in Title VII of
congressional intent to depart from the Treaty, thus eliminating the
only situation in which inconsistent federal legislation would gov-
ern. 26 The court also examined the Treaty's Senate history, which
showed concern for the right of United States companies to use their
own personnel to control company investments in Japan.2 7 Inter-
preting such concern as an intent in article VIII(l) "to create an ab-
solute rule permitting foreign nationals to control their overseas
investments," 28 the Fifth Circuit concluded that C. Itoh's hiring poli-
cies are not affected by Title VII requirements. 29
Interpreting the plain language of the Treaty, the Supreme
Court held that the language consistently indicates that the place of
incorporation governs corporate nationality.3 0 The Court also gave
significant weight to the Japanese and United States governments'
acquiescence to that construction. 3' Furthermore, the Court re-
jected Sumitomo's assertion that adherence to the Treaty's language
would frustrate the signatories' intent, 32 based on the history and
purpose of FCN Treaties in general, and ofJapan's Treaty in particu-
lar.3 3 The Court did not find any inconsistencies in applying the
same restrictions and obligations to foreign and domestic corpora-
tions alike. 34
Finally, the Sumitomo Court disagreed with the Second Circuit's
assessment that literal adherence to the Treaty's language would cre-
ate a "crazy-quilt pattern" imposing fewer limitations on branches of
Japanese companies operating in the United States than on locally
incorporated subsidiaries.3 5 The Court believed that treating locally
incorporated subsidiaries as United States entities would accord
26 643 F.2d at 356, 362. The FCN Treaty is self-executing; it requires no implement-
ing legislation. Id. As the supreme law of the land, the Treaty supersedes inconsistent
state law under art. VI, § 2 of the United States Constitution, which states that
the Laws of the United States ...and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary not withstanding.
Id. See also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty
is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation");
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
27 643 F.2d at 361-62.
28 Id. at 360.
29 Cf. supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
30 457 U.S. at 180-83.
31 Id. at 183-84.
32 Id. at 185-86.
33 Id. at 186-88.
34 Id. at 187-88.
35 638 F.2d at 556.
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them even greater rights and status than a branch of a foreign com-
pany.3 6 The sole advantage of operating a branch rather than a lo-
cally incorporated subsidiary arises from the article VIII(l) freedom
of choice in hiring provision, 37 the scope of which has not yet been
determined.
In sum, the Court rejected the Second and Fifth Circuits' opin-
ions that locally incorporated subsidiaries have the nationality of the
parent company, because regarding these subsidiaries as citizens of
the state of incorporation follows the plain language of the Treaty
and does not frustrate its purpose. In so doing, however, the Court
failed to address the only issue on which the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits did not agree: whether the article VIII(l) freedom of choice in
hiring provision protects absolutely a foreign employer operating in
the United States. The Court should have expanded its decision to
resolve the conflict between the Treaty and Title VII, by harmoniz-
ing the apparent purposes and case law dealing with each.
To evaluate the conflict between the FCN Treaty provisions and
Title VII's prohibition of employment discrimination, it is necessary
to examine the Treaty's purpose and provisions that relate to
Sumitomo and to review principles of treaty interpretation. It also is
useful to examine Title VII, the obligations it places on employers,
and the possible defenses it affords them. Finally, the relation be-
tween the Treaty and Title VII must be addressed to provide a
framework for balancing the aims of the two apparently conflicting
authorities.
The FCN Treaty between the United States and Japan, 38 con-
cluded on April 2, 1953, purports to "provide a legal framework
within which economic relations between the two countries can be
developed to their mutual advantage."13 9 This typifies the aims of
many FCN treaties the United States has concluded. 40
36 457 U.S. at 189. The Court rejected the Second Circuit's assertion that if locally
incorporated subsidiaries were not considered Japanese companies under the Treaty, they
"would be denied access to the legal system, would be left unprotected against unlawful
entry and molestation, and would be unable to dispose of property, obtain patents, engage
in importation and exportation, or make payments, remittances, and transfers of funds."
Id. Obviously, a New York corporation enjoys all these rights and more, according to the
Court. Id.
37 Id.
38 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
39 Commercial Treaties: Hearing on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with
Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Germany and Japan Before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1953) (statement of Alexis John-
son, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs).
40 See, e.g., Treaties of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation with China, 63 Stat. 1299,
T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (1946); Italy, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965 (1948); Israel, 5 U.S.T.
550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948 (1951); Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057 (1951);Japan, 4
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (1953); Federal Republic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839,
T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (1954); The Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (1956); and
Pakistan, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683 (1959).
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The current treaty belongs to the third phase of the develop-
ment of FCN Treaties. The first phase commenced with the inde-
pendence of the United States and continued until the early
twentieth century. Commercial treaties of this period concentrated
mainly on trade and shipping rights of individuals. 4 1 As corpora-
tions gradually took over international trade after the turn of the
century, the need arose for them to obtain legal status and rights
while operating abroad. The pre-World War II phase of FCN Trea-
ties granted corporations limited legal status and access to foreign
courts. 42 Only in the current postwar phase did United States corpo-
rations obtain the right to do business in other countries, with rights
equal to individuals in various areas, including forming and control-
ling local subsidiaries. 4 3
As the Sumitomo Court noted, the FCN Treaties served "to give
corporations of each signatory legal status in the territory of the
other party, and to allow them to conduct business in the other coun-
try on a comparable basis with domestic firms."'4 4 Furthermore,
"[t]he purpose of the treaties was not to give foreign corporations
greater rights than domestic companies, but instead to assure them
the right to conduct business on an equal basis without suffering dis-
crimination based on their alienage." '4 5
The Treaties accomplished that purpose by granting foreign
corporations "national treatment" and allowing foreign persons to
form locally incorporated subsidiaries. 46 Article VII(l) of the Treaty
sets forth the "national treatment" principle, which states that a na-
tional of the other party is treated like a national of the host coun-
try.4 7 This provision creates a framework for national treatment with
41 457 U.S. at 186.
42 Id. After the Supreme Court held in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
519, 588 (1839), that corporations can have no legal existence outside the boundaries of
the sovereignty in which they were created, treaties were needed to grant corporations
legal status abroad.
43 457 U.S. at 187 n.17.
44 Id. at 185-86.
45 Id. at 187-88.
46 Id. at 188.
47 Article XXII(1) of the Treaty more precisely defines the term "national treatment"
set forth in article VII(l):
The term "national treatment" means treatment accorded within the territo-
ries of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded
therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or other
objects, as the case may be, of such Party.
Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII(l). "National treatment" thus ordinarily denotes the high-
est level of protection afforded by commercial treaties, because it provides treatment equal
to that given domestic corporations. Parties often wish to grant somewhat less hospitable
terms. "Most-favored-nation" treatment is the next step in that direction, as set forth in
article VII(4). Such treatment is no less favorable than that accorded nationals or compa-
nies of any third country, according to article XXII(2) of the Treaty. See Walker, Modern
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 811 (1958).
1985]
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respect to commercial, industrial, financial, and other business activi-
ties within the territories of the other party. Article VII(l) states:
Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be permitted within
such territories: (a) to establish and maintain branches, agencies,
offices, factories and other establishments appropriate to the con-
duct of their business; (b) to organize companies under the general
company laws of such other Party, and to acquire majority interests
in companies of such other Party; and (c) to control and manage
enterprises which they have established or acquired. Moreover, en-
terprises which they control, whether in the form of individual pro-
prietorships, companies or otherwise, shall, in all that relates to the
conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded like enterprises controlled by nationals
and companies of such other Party. 48
Thus, the right of citizens of one country to form local subsidiaries
under the other country's corporate laws equates the alien corpora-
tion with an out-of-state corporation for purposes of national treat-
ment.49 An essential purpose of the Treaty-to ensure that one
party's right to conduct business within the other party's territory is
not hampered by discrimination against alien entities-therefore is
fulfilled. 50
Article VIII, the primary source of tension between the Treaty
and Title VII, provides in part: "Nationals and companies of either
Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other
Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel,
attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice."15 ' The scope
of the "of their choice" provision and its application according to
corporate nationality are unclear. Article XXII(3) further clouds the
application issue, establishing that: "Companies constituted under
the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either
Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridi-
cal status recognized within the territories of the other Party."'52
Although this language on its face indicates that the situs of incorpo-
ration determines corporate nationality, it permits two conflicting in-
terpretations. The first interpretation is that foreign corporations
and their subsidiaries, including those incorporated in the United
States, may employ management personnel of their choice. The sec-
ond interpretation is that a locally incorporated subsidiary of a for-
eign corporation is a United States corporation subject to all
domestic laws, including those prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion. The scope of the freedom of choice provisions and the applica-
48 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII(1).
49 See Commercial Treaties: Hearing on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Be-
tween the United States and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952).
50 457 U.S. at 188.
51 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII(l).
52 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII(3).
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tion according to corporate nationality must be addressed before
this conflict is settled.
Addressing the scope of the freedom of choice provisions in ar-
ticle VIII(l), one commentator 53 proposed that the Treaty parties
intended to permit employers to hire their own citizens as needed in
key positions, regardless of conflicting quotas or licensing restric-
tions on hiring aliens. 54  Another commentator suggested that,
viewed in its entirety, the Treaty merely seeks to
establish or confirm in the potential host country a governmental
policy of equity and hospitality to the foreign investor. This means,
above all, assurance that the enterprise and property of the alien will
be respected and that he will be accorded equal protection of the
laws alike with citizens of the country. 55
The definition and determination of corporate nationality also
figure prominently in this analysis. Six criteria for determining cor-
porate nationality are: (1) jurisdiction of incorporation; (2) principal
place of business; (3) voting control nationality; (4) dominant share-
holders' nationality; (5) management nationality; and (6) nationality
of control. 56 These factors have been categorized in three doctrines
for determining corporate nationality: center of administration,
center of exploitation, and place of incorporation. 57
Under each doctrine, a Japanese company's wholly owned sub-
sidiary, incorporated in the United States, would be deemed a
United States corporation. The Spiess defendants had proposed an
alternative theory of corporate nationality, the "treaty trader" test,
which the district court rejected. 58 Under the "treaty trader" test,
dominant ownership of stock determines corporate nationality. Ac-
53 Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 15, at 947.
54 Id. at 953-54 & nn.28-33. The author claims the freedom of choice provision pro-
motes foreign investment "by assuring foreign employers the right to choose their own
citizens for important positions." Id. at 975. He also observes tension between encourag-
ing foreign investment and harmonizing domestic civil rights laws with conflicting values
of other cultures. Id.
55 Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United
States Practice, 5 Am. J. COMP. L. 229, 230 (1956). The author of the above article and
others on treaties protecting foreign investments, see supra note 47, Herman Walker, Jr.,
served as Adviser on Commercial Treaties at the State Department at the time this Treaty
was drafted. "According to the State Department, Mr. Walker was responsible for formu-
lation of the postwar type of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty and negotiated
several of the treaties for the United States." 457 U.S. at 181 & n.6. Mr. Walker's articles
provide useful insights into the United States Government's intent and purpose in negoti-
ating this Treaty. See also Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties,
50 AM.J. INT'L L. 373, 385-86 (1956). See infra text accompanying notes 70 & 71.
56 See Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints of Foreign En-
terprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (1961).
57 M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 297-301 (2d ed. 1950). The place of in-
corporation doctrine is used widely in Europe under the term "siege social." Center of
administration denotes that nationality is determined "at the place where the commercial
business is carried on. ... Id. at 297. Center of exploitation refers to "the main place
where the legal person executes its purpose." Id. at 298.
58 643 F.2d at 356.
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cording to the Sumitomo Court, this theory conflicts with the Treaty's
express selection in article XXII(3) of place of incorporation as the
determining factor.59 Established principles of law also echo the lit-
eral interpretation of article XXII(3). 60 Finally, United States v. R.P.
Oldham Co., widely recognized as expressing settled corporate na-
tionality law, holds that the place of incorporation determines corpo-
rate nationality. 6'
Established rules of treaty interpretation help form the frame-
work for evaluating the effect of the FCN Treaty on Japanese compa-
nies' subsidiaries operating in the United States. In Maximov v.
United States,62 a case on which the Sumitomo Court heavily relied, the
Supreme Court held that the interpretation that is "more consonant
with [the Treaty's] language, purpose, and intent" should prevail. 63
Thus, the treaty language controls unless that interpretation clearly
conflicts with the parties' intent. A court must therefore examine
contemporaneous or current government statements of intent by
negotiators or by those currently responsible for treaty enforcement.
Article XXII(3) indicates that the parties expected that the place of
incorporation would control in determining corporate nationality. 64
The Maximov Court resolved the tension between the corporate juris-
diction laws and the provision giving subsidiaries freedom in hiring
in favor of the former.
More than fifty years ago in Asakura v. City of Seattle65 the Court
held that "[t]reaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit,
and when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights
that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the
latter is preferred." '66 Two factors support this conclusion:
(1) United States courts should not engage in foreign policy-making;
and (2) treaty beneficiaries must be granted all possible rights under
a treaty.
A secondary source for treaty interpretation is the opinion of the
parties' responsible government agencies. The Court in Sumitomo re-
59 457 U.S. at 182-83 n.8.
60 See United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
Congress also has enacted statutes under which corporations are citizens of both the states
of incorporation and of the location of the principal place of business, if different. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(c), 1441(a) (1982).
61 152 F. Supp. at 823.
62 373 U.S. 49 (1963). Plaintiffs claimed exemption from capital gains tax as United
Kingdom subjects pursuant to article 14 of the United States-United Kingdom income
tax convention. The Second Circuit held that plaintiff, as a United States trust, was subject
to United States income tax because the exemption clearly was intended for "residents of
the United Kingdom." Id. at 56. The Court held that the Second Circuit's interpretation
was more consonant with the Convention's language, purpose, and intent. Id. at 51.
63 Id.
64 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII(3).
65 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
66 Id. at 342.
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lied on its decision in Kolovrat v. Oregon67 in which it evaluated an
alien's right to inherit by intestacy both realty and personalty in light
of a government agency's treaty interpretation. The Sumitomo Court
opined that "[a]lthough not conclusive, the meaning attributed to
treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their ne-
gotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight."' 68 In 1982 the
Governments of Japan and the United States agreed that a Japanese
company's subsidiary, incorporated in the United States, is not pro-
tected by the Treaty, and thus should comply with United States civil
rights statutes.69
Furthermore, the Court considered the extensive writings of
one of the Treaty's negotiators, 70 in which article VIII(l) of the
Treaty was construed as seeking to counter employment discrimina-
tion against foreign nationals working in the United States and
against United States citizens working abroad.7 1 No evidence indi-
cates that the negotiators included article VIII(l) to protect foreign
companies located in the United States from discrimination charges
by local employees.
Examining the background of Title VII is essential to evaluate
the employment discrimination claims involved in Sumitomo. Title
VII is the most comprehensive federal scheme enacted to combat
employment discrimination. 72 Under Title VII, employers73 cannot
refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against an individual because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green74 sets out the four essential elements of a plaintiff's
claim. The plaintiff must (1) belong to a racial minority; (2) apply
and be qualified for the job for which the employer sought appli-
cants; (3) be rejected despite his or her qualifications; and (4) show
67 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
68 457 U.S. at 184-85.
69 Id. at 183-84 & n.9, citing Department of State Cable No. 03300, from the United
States Embassy in Tokyo to the Secretary of State, dated Feb. 26, 1982; Diplomatic Com-
munication from the Embassy ofJapan in Washington, D.C. to the United States Depart-
ment of State, Apr. 21, 1982.
70 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See also 457 U.S. at 181 n.6.
72 Reischel, The Legal Sources of Protection Against Employment Discrimination, in EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY-RESPONSIBILITIES, RIGHTS, REMEDIES 9 (J. Pemberton ed.
1975). Other civil rights laws include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1982) (applying to federally assisted programs); the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1982); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982).
73 Title VII applies to the protected groups against discrimination by any employer,
which is defined as any person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who employs
more than fifteen people. The Act excludes as employers the United States or corpora-
tions wholly owned by its government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). The Act also does
not apply to religious organizations (but only for religion-based discrimination), or to the
employment of aliens outside the territorial United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1982).
74 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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that after this rejection the position remained open, and the em-
ployer continued to seek similarly qualified applicants. 75 Although
North Americans (or nonjapanese) do not constitute a racial minor-
ity, plaintiffs in Sumitomo fall under either or both protected catego-
ries of national origin or sex. 76
In the seminal case in national origin discrimination, Espinoza v.
Farah Manufacturing Co. ,77 plaintiff, a Mexican citizen with legal resi-
dence in the United States, was denied employment because com-
pany policy prohibited hiring aliens. The Court defined national
origin as the "country where a person was born, or more broadly,
the country from which his or her ancestors came. ' '78 The Court in-
terpreted this definition literally, holding that Title VII protects
against discrimination based on nationality, but not against discrimi-
nation based on citizenship, 79 unless it is merely pretextual for the
former.
The Court in McDonnell Douglas developed a three-step process
for dealing with Title VII violations. First, the plaintiff must make a
prima facie showing of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the
defendant employer to articulate why the characteristic sought or
avoided is job-related or is a business necessity.80 If the defendant
succeeds, the plaintiff must show that a less discriminatory, equally
effective alternative exists that is not excessively burdensome on the
defendant. This would tend to show that the employer's require-
ment is merely pretextual, and not a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ).8 '
The concept of a BFOQ acts as a mitigating factor in legiti-
75 Id. at 802.
76 The Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), how-
ever, held that Title VII antidiscrimination provisions also cover white plaintiffs (employer
was sued for firing one black and two white employees for suspected misconduct, and
subsequently rehiring only the black employee). Id. at 280.
77 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
78 Id. at 88.
79 Id. at 89-90. See also Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F.
Supp. 215, 218 (W.D. La. 1980), holding that Title VII plaintiffs need not necessarily be-
long to a national origin minority constituting a current political entity. In Roach plaintiff
was of Acadian ancestry. The court allowed plaintiff's claim despite the fact that Acadia
was never a country. Some cases have considered constitutional limitations on a citizen-
ship requirement for employment. See, e.g., Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 (1976)
(holding that fifth amendment prohibits a United States Civil Service Commission regula-
tion barring all noncitizens from the federal competitive civil service, because due process
requires a legitimate basis for an overriding national interest to permit such a require-
ment); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,646 (1973) (holding that indiscriminate sweep-
ing dismissal of aliens from all positions in New York civil service violated the equal
protection clause of fourteenth amendment because it was not related to the accomplish-
ment of substantial state interests); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (fourteenth
amendment prevents Connecticut from excluding aliens from practice of law).
80 The Court reinterpreted that step of the McDonnell Douglas process in Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
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mately distinguishing between job applicants' characteristics and
qualifications. On rare occasions one of the characteristics required
for a job incumbent legitimately may include sex, race, religion, or
national origin. In the theater, for example, parts written for black
men ordinarily must be filled by black men. Or, it is easy to imagine
that skin or hair care products produced especially for black people
should be modeled and advertised by black people to illustrate prop-
erly the desired effect. Religious groups can require allegiance to
the faith for related positions. On the other hand, a teacher need not
be of French origin to teach properly the French language and cul-
ture.82 To restrict this escape hatch, the Supreme Court and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have declared
that the BFOQ exemption is meant to be construed narrowly. 83
In Dothard v. Rawlinson84 the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer may not stereotype a group's abilities and apply that stereo-
type to one member. 85  In the context of Sumitomo, some
nonjapanese and/or female applicants might fit the qualifications de-
sired by a Japanese company. For an import company operating in
the United States and dealing with local businesses, these qualifica-
tions could include familiarity with the languages, customs, cultures,
and business practices of both the United States and Japan. This
conclusion necessarily would limit the scope of the Treaty's freedom
of choice provisions in light of Title VII's requirements.
Another permutation of the Treaty's freedom of choice provi-
sions permits that hiring decisions made pursuant to customers'
preferences should be protected. In fact, the Second Circuit's opin-
ion in Sumitomo contains dicta suggesting that "acceptability to those
persons with whom the company or branch does business" 86 could
constitute a BFOQ. Such an interpretation "will signify a major de-
parture from the traditional construction of the [BFOQJ excep-
tion."'87 It also would conflict with, among others, Fifth Circuit 88
and EEOC 89 decisions that reject customer preference as a BFOQ.
The Ninth Circuit followed suit in condemning the use of cus-
82 Comment, Japanese Employers and Title VII: Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,
15J. INT'L L. & POL. 653, 671 (1983).
83 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). See also EEOC Guidelines, 29
C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a), 1606.4 (1984).
84 433 U.S. at 321 (female of small stature sought position as prison guard).
85 Id. at 333.
86 638 F.2d at 559.
87 Recent Developments, Foreign Corporations: Applicability of United States Civil Rights
Statutes, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 418, 421 & nn.25-27.
88 Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971) (purported customer preference for female flight attendants not a valid
BFOQ).
89 Entertaining Customers Not Valid Basis for Sex Discrimination, 1973 EEOC DEc. (CCH)
6247 (Dec. No. 71-2338) (June 2, 1971) (holding that male customers' preference for
male hunting companions did not constitute a valid BFOQexception).
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tomer preference as a BFOQ. In Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co. 90 the court
decided that foreign customer preference does not justify sex dis-
crimination in employment. The court reasoned that if other nations
could exercise such preferences, they could dictate discrimination in
the United States, and no foreign nation can be permitted to compel
the nonenforcement of Title VII on United States soil.9 1 Further-
more, the Framers of the Constitution would not have wanted the
United States to bow to a foreign sovereign's demands. 92 The
United States is one of Japan's most important trading partners. 93
Although every government wants to attract foreign trade, the
.United States is loath to sacrifice adherence to its laws to appease
foreign investors94 and likely would not be forced to in this situation.
The tension between the Treaty and Title VII leaves two ques-
tions. First, the public policy question remains whether antidis-
crimination laws are more important than attracting foreign
investors who want to exercise control over their investments. 95 The
high cost of domestic unemployment and society's responsibility in
90 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
91 Id. at 1276-77. See also American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 448-
49, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218, 221-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959), modified, 10 A.D.2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d
157 (1960), affid, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961); Note, Commercial
Treaties, supra note 15 at 968 & n.108.
92 Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 775, 828-29 n.307 (1982).
93 Japanese exports to the United States totaled $36.34 billion in 1982, with an esti-
mated Japanese trade surplus of almost $20 billion. N.Y. Times,Jan. 20, 1983, at D17, col.
2.
94 See, e.g., American Jewish Congress, 23 Misc.2d at 448-49, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 221-22.
The court rejected the defenses of business necessity and customer's religious preference
as a BFOQ for Aramco's refusal to hire Jewish applicants to satisfy Saudi Arabia, in the
State of New York, in violation of local statutes. "New York State is not a province of
Saudi Arabia, nor is the constitution and statute of New York State to be cast aside to
protect the oil profits of Aramco." Id. at 448-49, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The court also
cited Senate Resolution 323, adopted by the Senate of the United States on July 26, 1956,
which reads in part:
Whereas it is a primary principle of our Nation that there shall be no
distinction among United States citizens based on their individual religious
affiliations and since any attempt by foreign nations to create such distinction
among our citizens in the granting of personal or commercial access or any
other rights otherwise available to United States citizens generally is incon-
sistent with our principles; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that it regards any such dis-
tinctions directed against United States citizens as incompatible with the rela-
tions that should exist among friendly nations, and that in all negotiations
between the United States and any foreign state every reasonable effort
should be made to maintain this principle.
Id. at 448-49, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
95 Authors have expressed concern that increased regulation will drive away foreign
investors. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. See also Kirschner, The Extraterritorial
Application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 34 LAB. L.J. 394, 402-03 (1983). Kirschner
argued that the harmful effects of the extraterritorial application of Title VII on United
States foreign relations will be exacerbated only by Sumitomo's application of Title VII to
foreign enterprises operating in the United States and may elicit the retaliatory application
of foreign laws, as well as a decline in foreign investment in the United States. Id.
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equal employment opportunity indicate that such laws are more im-
portant. Moreover, merely requiring employers' job qualifications to
meet the BFOQ test would hardly prove so burdensome as to dis-
courage most foreign investors.9 6
The second question is whether the Treaty supplants domestic
federal civil rights laws. Sumitomo settles the issue of corporate na-
tionality, by resolving the question of a Japanese parent's United
States subsidiary's standing to invoke rights under the Treaty. Un-
fortunately, the Court left unresolved the paramount issue of the
level of adherence to Title VII required of foreign companies operat-
ing in the United States through domestic corporations.
The Court also refused to address the questions whether
Sumitomo may assert any article VIII(l) rights of its parent,9 7 and
whether Japanese citizenship or nationality may be a BFOQ for cer-
tain positions at Sumitomo.9 8 The Court avoided deciding whether
a foreign corporation may, under the Treaty, discriminate in employ-
ment in the United States and thus violate federal laws. Therefore,
Sumitomo fails to resolve the conflict between the Second and Fifth
Circuits.99 Although consistent in its logic, the Court did not take
needed action to clarify the relation between United States employ-
ment laws and foreign corporations.
The United States has concluded FCN treaties with dozens of
nations. Furthermore, rising foreign direct investment has increased
the number of foreign corporations that operate in the United States
and employ many of their own citizens as well as those of the host
country.100 Sumitomo presented an ideal opportunity for the Court to
establish ground rules for the relatively new contest between foreign
companies and United States employment laws. As this important
issue remains unresolved, more plaintiffs doubtless will step forward
to question their employers' rights and responsibilities under United
States laws. The Court should have foreseen such a consequence
96 The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), supra note 72, has been inter-
preted to cover foreign employers. See Delta Match Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1953)
(NLRA applies to foreign corporation's wholly owned subsidiary incorporated in the
United States); In re The Royal Bank of Canada (SanJuan Branch), 67 N.L.R.B. 403 (1946)
(NLRA applies to the United States branch of a foreign corporation).
Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp 1251 (D.N.J. 1983), affd, 728 F.2d 607
(3d Cir. 1984), however, held that United States citizens working abroad for United States
companies are not protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). 555 F. Supp. at 1263. This result can be distinguished from
the application of Title VII in Sumitomo because the United States has a much greater inter-
est in enforcing its laws on its own soil.
97 457 U.S. at 189-90 n.19.
98 Id.
99 See supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text.
100 Japanese direct investment in the United States totaled $6.5 billion at the end of
1981. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1982, at DI, col. 3.
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and made a greater effort to flesh out the meaning and scope of the
freedom of choice provision in article VIII(l) of the Treaty.
Rules of treaty interpretation indicate that departure from the
plain reading of a treaty provision requires contrary evidence of in-
tent from the negotiating history and other supporting materials.
Apparently, the freedom of choice provision initially served to cir-
cumvent stringent state laws restricting the employment of aliens in
the United States, both by numbers and by occupation. The Japa-
nese especially desired protection from these laws; thus, the Treaty's
purpose is to circumvent or eliminate discriminatory employment
laws, not employment discrimination laws, in the United States.' 0 '
The Treaty seeks to protect foreign employers from ultranationalism
and percentile limitations in the host country. 10 2
An essential factor in harmonizing the Treaty and Title VII is
the effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations. "[S]o far
as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can
become the subject ofjudicial cognizance in the courts of this coun-
try, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforce-
ment, modification, or repeal."' 0 3 Accordingly, an act of Congress
can negate the provisions of a treaty under the concept of "last ex-
pression of sovereign will.' 01 4 The later manifestation of will con-
trols, because a treaty and congressional legislation are supreme and
equal. ' 0 5
The treaty parties in Sumitomo did not contemplate the effect of
United States employment discrimination laws when concluding the
1953 FCN Treaty, because no such laws were in effect at the time.
Title VII was not enacted until 1964. The other federal law prohibit-
ing employment discrimination, section 1981, was not applied to pri-
vate employers until 1976.106 Under Whitney v. Robertson 10 7 when a
101 Walker, supra note 55, at 386 & n.62.
102 457 U.S. 181 n.6. Other commentators agree that the provision sought to ensure
that Japanese employers could hire key or specialized employees from among their own
citizens. See, e.g., Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 15, at 953; Comment,Japanese Employ-
ers, supra note 82, at 684.
103 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884),followed in Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 195 (1888).
104 See The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581,
600 (1889).
1O5 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 721 (1893) (Chinese subjects
deported pursuant to 1892 Act prohibiting Chinese immigration, which directly contra-
dicted 1868 Treaty between United States and China).
106 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 & n.i l (1976). Section 1981 states in
part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
107 124 U.S. at 190.
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treaty and a statute affect the same issue, "courts will always en-
deavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either . ... 108 Neverthe-
less, the Court held in Baker v. Carr'0 9 that when treaty provisions
conflict with a valid subsequent federal statute, "a court will not un-
dertake to construe a treaty in a manner inconsistent with a subse-
quent federal statute . . ,.1.
The Fifth Circuit's resolution of the conflict between Title VII
and the FCN Treaty as expressed in Spiess remains intact after
Sumitomo, and therefore, allows Japanese companies total freedom in
the preferential hiring of their own citizens. Rather than harmoniz-
ing the statute and the treaty, as required by such decisions as
Whitney and Baker, the Court disregarded Title VII. The Treaty and
Title VII could coexist if foreign firms were to hire their own nation-
als for positions qualifying for the BFOQ exemption, and hire the
remainder of their workforce in compliance with federal civil rights
laws. In view of Japan's immense trade surplus with the United
States,"' it seems unlikely that this restriction would be very harm-
ful to the United States economy. In the meantime, it would con-
tinue to promote much needed dedication to, and enforcement of,
equal employment opportunity in the United States.
-JOHN BRUCE STERNLICHT
108 Id. at 194.
109 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
110 Id. at 212. This result can be distinguished from the result in Asakura v. City of
Seattle, 265 U.S. at 332. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. Asakura involved a
conflict between a local ordinance prohibiting aliens from pawnbroking, and the following
treaty provisions on which plaintiff relied:
The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have
liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on
trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease and occupy houses, manufacto-
ries, warehouses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land
for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything inci-
dent to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or sub-
jects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established
265 U.S. at 340 (quoting Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 5, 1911, United
States-Japan, art. I, T.S. No. 558, 37 Stat. 1504).
The distinction involves article VI, § 2 of the United States Constitution, under which
all states' judges are bound to subjugate any contrary thing in the state constitution or
laws to a treaty made under the authority of the United States. See supra note 26. Asakura
involves a law of a state's political subdivision, but Sumitomo involves an act of Congress.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
I I I See supra notes 93 & 95 and accompanying text.
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